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Abstract 
Early retirement schemes and disability insurance in the Netherlands have both been 
reformed during the past decades. The reforms have increased incentives to continue working 
and have decreased the substitution between early retirement and disability. This study 
investigates the impact of the reforms on labour market exit probabilities. We use 
administrative data for workers in the Dutch health care sector between 1999 and 2006. We 
estimate a multinomial Logit model for transitions out of the labour force. The empirical 
results suggest that the reforms have been effective, as the labour market participation rate of 
the elderly has increased. The concept of substitute pathways into retirement seems less 
relevant today as the results confirm that disability insurance is closed off as an early 
retirement exit route.  
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Abstract in Dutch 
Gedurende de afgelopen decennia zijn de regelingen voor vervroegde uittreding (VUT en 
prepensioen) en arbeidsongeschiktheid in Nederland hervormd. Daardoor is de prikkel om 
langer door te gaan met werken toegenomen. Deze studie onderzoekt de invloed van de 
hervormingen op het vervroegd verlaten van de arbeidsmarkt. We gebruiken een 
administratief databestand van werknemers van de sector zorg en welzijn in Nederland over 
de periode 1999-2006. We schatten een multinomiaal Logit-model voor de verschillende 
manieren waarop een oudere werknemer de arbeidsmarkt kan verlaten. De empirische 
resultaten bevestigen een toename van de participatiegraad van ouderen en suggereren dat de 
hervormingen effectief zijn geweest. Het concept van de ‗glijbaan‘ naar het pensioen blijkt 
minder relevant te zijn geworden. De kans op instroom in de arbeidsongeschiktheidsregeling 
hangt nauwelijks meer samen met het recht op vervroegde uittreding.  
    
Steekwoorden: Vervroegde Uittreding, Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, Arbeidsaanbod 
     - 3 - 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
The labour force participation rate of men aged 55 to 64 decreased substantially in many 
OECD countries during the 1970s and 1980s. Financial incentives, and in particular the high 
implicit tax when continuing to work, have played an important role (Gruber and Wise, 
2004). Apart from the financial incentives, employees may have had a preference for early 
retirement because of the household situation, health or social norms. Furthermore, 
employers had a preference for early retirement as they wanted their unproductive workers to 
leave. Finally, governments of several countries used to have a preference for early 
retirement, as they believed that youth unemployment could be lowered through earlier 
retirement of the older workforce.
2 Remarkably, the decline in labour force participation rates 
of men aged 55 to 64 was similar to that of France, Germany and the Netherlands, whereas 
labour market institutions were quite different (Duval, 2010). Such similar developments 
seem in line with the concept of ―pathways into retirement‖. According to this concept, the 
preference for early labour market exit has led to early retirement through different exit 
routes which were close substitutes for each other. In other words, individual employees had 
the ‗choice‘ between several exit routes, including early retirement, disability and 
unemployment. Push factors generated by the organisation of work have been essential in the 
rise of such substitute exit routes (Kohli and Rein, 1991; Riphahn, 1997; Larsen and 
Pedersen, 2008). However, from the 1990s onwards the social insurance and early retirement 
systems of several countries have been reformed. The concept of substitute pathways into 
early retirement may have lost importance during the last decade. In this study, we focus on 
the development of two major pathways for labour market exit in the Netherlands: early 
retirement and disability.
3 
  This study is based on the general hypothesis that recent reforms, which aimed at 
increasing the participation rate of older workers, have led to a different functioning of 
institutions surrounding early retirement. Our first hypothesis is that the probability of inflow 
into early retirement and disability has decreased on individual level. As a consequence the 
probability to remain employed has increased. Our second and main hypothesis is that the 
                                                 
2 The idea that early retirement reduces unemployment rests on the thought that the number of jobs is fixed. It is 
nowadays widely recognized that the thought is wrong (Barr and Diamond, 2009; Gruber and Wise, 2010). 
3 In this paper we disregard unemployment, as it hardly qualifies as a pathway during our period of study. The 
Dutch unemployment rate of elderly is about the same as for other age groups, and furthermore the Dutch 
unemployment rate is very low in an international perspective.   - 4 - 
 
 
reforms have stopped substitution between exit routes. In particular, disability insurance is 
not used anymore as a route for early retirement in the Netherlands. We discuss recent 
empirical evidence and, in a second step, investigate the hypotheses by applying multiple 
choice models to a new large administrative dataset for the Netherlands. 
  On the basis of the administrative data containing workers of the Dutch health care 
sector between 1999 and 2006, we provide evidence for both hypotheses. First, the inflow 
into early retirement and disability has decreased and the employment rate of older 
individuals increased. Second, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that disability is 
no longer used as an alternative early retirement route. Several empirical studies have shown 
that disability has served as an early exit route in the past. Our results confirm the hypothesis 
that the reforms have decreased substitution from early retirement schemes towards the 
disability scheme. 
  The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the reforms of Dutch early retirement and disability schemes. The section contains figures 
showing that the aggregate inflow into early retirement and disability decreased substantially. 
Section 3 discusses previous research based on survey data for the 1980s and early 1990s. 
This research has shown that the concept of substitute pathways holds indeed for the 
Netherlands. In section 4 and 5, we discuss and employ administrative data of the Dutch 
health care pension fund between 1999 and 2006 to investigate the impact of the reforms on 
labour market exit probabilities. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Early retirement and disability insurance 
During the economically prosperous period starting about a decade after the Second World 
War, the Netherlands set up an extensive welfare state including a pension system and a 
public disability insurance scheme. The two most important elements in the pension system 
are the state pension, which is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the occupational 
pension system, which is capital funded. During the economic crisis of the 1980s, the unions 
and employer organizations installed an early retirement scheme in addition to the existing 
arrangements. Soon it became clear that the pension and welfare system was not sustainable 
in the long run. A series of reforms followed. This section discusses the most important 
reforms in the early retirement and pension system and the disability insurance schemes.   - 5 - 
 
 
Table 1  Main reforms of early retirement (ER) and disability insurance (DI) schemes 
  Pensions and early retirement  Disability insurance 
     
1957  Introduction state pension   
1967    Introduction DI scheme 
1976  Introduction first PAYG early retirement scheme   
1987 
 
Reduction replacement rate from 80 to 70%. DI 




Reward for firms engaging partially disabled; fine for firms 
if worker becomes disabled. 
1993    Lower replacement rate for long-lasting disabled 
1996 
 
Employers pay first year of sickness benefits. Abolition of 
1992 measure.  
1997  Start of transition towards capital-funded, 
actuarially fair, and less generous ER schemes   
1998    Introduction experience rating 
2002    Gatekeeper Improvement Act 
2004    Employers also pay second year of sickness benefits 
2006  Direct transition to actuarial fairness; integration of 
ER schemes into old-age pension schemes   
DI split up into schemes for fully and permanently 
disabled and temporarily and/or partially disabled 
 
2.1  Old age pension and early retirement 
The Dutch state pension system was installed in 1957 (Table 1). The statutory retirement age 
in the Dutch state pension system was and still is 65. From that age on, Dutch citizens that 
lived in the Netherlands from age 15 to 64 receive a state pension benefit.
4 This first-pillar 
pension benefit guarantees an income of 70% of the minimum wage for singles, and 50% of 
the minimum wage for each member of a couple. The pension is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis, and pension benefits are not related to work history. 
  On top of the flat-rate benefit, most retired employees receive a mandatory 
occupational pension. They are capital funded and mostly defined-benefit pensions. 
Occupational pensions are subject to negotiations between unions and employer 
organisations. The government is involved in the occupational pensions in two ways. First, 
pension savings receive a special fiscal treatment. The taxation of the schemes is 
characterised as an EET-system (exempt-exempt-taxed). Contributions to the scheme are tax 
exempt, the returns on the assets in the capital funding system are exempt, and the pensions 
are taxed. Second, the government facilitates occupational pension schemes by extension to 
all workers in the concerning sector or firm.
5 Agreements between unions and employer 
                                                 
4 For each year spent abroad between the ages of 15 and 65 the state pension is lowered by 2%.  
5 Collective labour agreements are either made at the firm level or at the sectoral level.   - 6 - 
 
 
organisations typically receive the ‗generally binding‘ approval from the government, and 
hence the occupational pensions are mandatory for workers in the concerning firm or sector. 
  During the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, many sectors of industry introduced 
early retirement schemes. The schemes were financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and were 
highly actuarially unfair. After reaching a certain age, a worker could retire and receive early 
retirement benefits of about 80% of the last earned wage in gross terms. Due to the 
progressive tax system and a continued accrual of old-age pension rights, the net replacement 
rate was typically higher than 80%. Working one more year, and so postponing the early 
retirement benefit claim, would not lead to an increase in the replacement rate. As a result, 
the implicit tax rate on continuing to work for another year was about 100% for many 
workers, implying that work would not generate any additional income. Not too surprisingly, 
empirical studies show that the impact on the participation of elderly between the ages of 55 
and 64 was strong (Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999, Gruber and Wise, 2004, Euwals, van Vuuren 
and Wolthoff, 2010).  
  The early retirement schemes are held responsible for a substantial part of the drop in 
the participation rate of men aged 55 to 64. The drop in the participation rate of elderly was 
actually in line with the goal of the early retirement schemes. The Netherlands went through a 
severe economic crisis, and the explicit goal was to allow firms to lay off older workers in 
order to save jobs for the young. The schemes however became costly and doubts arose about 
the saving of jobs for the young. In 2007, about four out of ten individuals between the ages 
of 60 and 64 received an early retirement benefit. 
  During the 1990s, the unions and employer organisations agreed upon transforming 
the generous and actuarial unfair early retirement schemes into less generous and actuarially 
fair schemes. One goal was to remove the implicit tax on continuing to work. Another goal 
was to limit the costs. In most sectors of industry it was decided to implement transitional 
arrangements which could take more than ten years. The first transition started on April 1, 
1997 for civil servants. For some sectors of industry the transition started later. The transition 
should have been completed in 2022. The installation of a new law on January 1, 2006 
however considerably accelerated the transition. 
  Since January 1, 2006, early retirement schemes are integrated into the capital-funded 
occupational pension system. Before this date both systems were in principle independent. 
Within the new system early retirement before age 65 is still possible. The special fiscal 















adjusted actuarially fair. Some of the large Dutch pension funds allow for an early retirement 
benefit of about 70% of the average earned wage at age 63. 
 






















Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
 
Figure 2: Pathways into early retirement in the Netherlands, men age 55-59 and 60-64 
 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
 
2.2  Disability insurance 
The public disability insurance system was installed in 1967, ten years after the introduction 
of the state pension system (Table 1). All employees in the Netherlands are covered by this 
Disability Insurance (DI), regardless of their work history. The DI scheme insures workers 
who do not recover from sickness within two years. Any form of disability is insured, 
whether stemming from social or professional risk. Workers becoming disabled for at least 
80% receive full DI benefits. Partially disabled, who are disabled for less than 80%, receive 
pro rata benefits. A significant portion of the partially disabled is involved in gainful 
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and van Vuuren, 2007). In contrast to the DI schemes in many other western countries, the 
Dutch DI scheme lacks a minimum reference period. All workers are fully insured from the 
first working day.  
  During the 1970s the annual growth of the number of DI recipients was about 11 
percent. This increase was much higher than expected at the introduction of the system. 
During the 1970s and most of the 1980s, benefits were 80% of final pay, entry conditions 
were weak, and enforcement by the public body was lax. To slow down the inflow and 
decrease the number of recipients many reforms took place starting in the late 1980s. In 1987, 
the replacement rate was reduced from 80 to 70% (Table 1). Moreover, labour market 
considerations would not play a role anymore in the disability assessment. However, the 
volume and cost reductions were not substantial. One of the most important reasons was that 
the replacement rate reduction was repaired in collective labour agreements. 
  More financial incentives were introduced to confront employees and employers with 
the financial consequences of the use of sickness and disability benefits. In 1992, a premium 
differentiation system for sickness benefits and a (not long-lived) no-claim bonus system 
were introduced. The system implied that employers had to pay a penalty for each employee 
entering DI. On the other hand, a firm employing a DI beneficiary for at least one year would 
receive a bonus. Until 1993, a fully disabled person received a wage-related benefit of 
unlimited duration. Since then, both the duration and the level of the benefit became 
dependent on the recipient‘s age and employment history. However, this loss in benefits was 
repaired for about four out of five employees through collective labour agreements (Social 
and Economic Council, 2002). A restricted own risk for employers for sickness benefits was 
introduced in 1994 in order to reduce absence through illness. Large firms became 
responsible for the continued payment of wages during the first six weeks of sickness, and 
small firms for the first two weeks. Since 1996 employers pay sickness benefits during the 
entire first year. The no-claim bonus system was replaced in 1998 by a system of experience 
rating. Firms could opt out of the public system to bear the risk themselves or to reinsure the 
risk with a private insurer.  
  Many policy reforms during the late 1990s and early 2000s aimed at achieving a more 
efficient administration. This has resulted in the merger of five different administrative 
offices into one public monopoly (UWV) which is responsible for the administration of all DI 
and unemployment benefits in the Netherlands. The ‗Gatekeeper Improvement Act‘ was 
implemented in 2002, implying more stringent reintegration obligations of the employer and   - 9 - 
 
 
its employees. In order to be eligible for the DI, the public administrative office assesses 
whether both employer and employee have met the reintegration obligations.  
  The duration of the sickness benefit period has been extended from one to two years 
in 2004, increasing the financial incentive for employers to prevent disability. In 2006, the 
previous DI scheme (the so-called WAO) is replaced by two new schemes under the umbrella 
‗Income According to Capacity for Work Act‘ (WIA). The WIA focuses on the remaining 
capacity to earn income. It distinguishes between fully and long-lasting disabled and 
temporarily and/or partially disabled. The first group only contains former employees who 
are both fully and permanently incapacitated.
6 They qualify for earnings-related benefits with 
a replacement rate of 75%. The second group contains individuals who are partially disabled 
or temporarily fully disabled. They may either qualify for earnings-related benefits or 
benefits which are based on the minimum-wage level, depending the remaining work 
capacity and employment history. The benefit system includes a financial incentive for the DI 
recipient to use his remaining work capacity. Under the WIA, employees who become 
disabled for less than 35% are no longer insured. 
  Between 1967 and 1991 the share of DI recipients in the age group 20 to 64 increased 
from 3.5 to 9.7% (Figure 1). The aggregate data suggest that the adjustments in 1987 did not 
have an effect on the use of DI. The first drop occurs between 1993 and 1996, when a final 
level of 8.9% is reached. Next, the use of DI increases back again to the old level in 2001 and 
2002. From then on, we see a downward trend until a share of 8.3% is reached in 2008, which 
is the lowest share since 1982. The last three policy measures are held largely responsible for 
this decreasing trend, in particular the Gatekeeper Improvement Act and the increased 
financial responsibility of employers through the payment of sickness benefits. 
  The number of men receiving a disability benefit increased over time until the 
beginning of the 1990s (Figure 1).
7 From the end of the 1990s, the main development for the 
55-59 year old is a decrease of the share of DI recipients from 25 to 19% (left panel of Figure 
2). The other categories in the figure remain stable over time, so that employment has 
increased. The fraction of DI recipients among 60-64 year-old men decreased from 32 to 26% 
(right panel of Figure 2). In this age group, the fraction of individuals receiving an 
unemployment benefit or another benefit decreased by 8%-points. At the same time the 
                                                 
6 The disability degree in this group is between 80 and 100%. Recovery is ruled out or cannot be expected 
within five years.  
7 We focus on men as developments for women are mainly driven by cohort effects (see Euwals et al., 2011).   - 10 - 
 
 
fraction of individuals retiring early rose by 9%-points. Overall, the employment rate of the 
oldest age category has also increased. 
 
3.  Literature overview on substitute pathways 
Already in the beginning of the 1990s, Kohli and Rein (1991) argued that the increase in 
early labour market exit during the 1970s and early 1980s was driven by a common trend: the 
slowdown in economic growth and the substantial increase in unemployment. So according 
to Kohli and Rein‘s concept, which we refer to as ―pathways for labour market exit‖ or 
―pathways into early retirement‖, push factors generated by the organization of work were 
decisive in the rise of generous exit arrangements. A pathway can be defined as a 
combination of institutional arrangements to manage the transition process between exit from 
work and entry into the pension system. Many OECD countries developed one or more 
pathways into early retirement.  
  Institutional arrangements creating pathways for early retirement were often 
constructed for purposes other than early labour market exit. In France, unemployment 
insurance was a typical pathway; in Germany both unemployment and disability insurance; 
and in the Netherlands the disability insurance schemes. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
unemployment and disability insurance were made more easily accessible for older workers 
in many countries. In Sweden unemployed persons above age 63 would receive a disability 
pension without medical justification. Some countries facilitated early labour market exit 
through the old-age pension scheme. In Germany a work-history condition allowed workers 
to retire at age 63. 
  The empirical literature shows that the concept of substitute pathways applied to the 
Dutch labour market situation in the 1980s and early 1990s. Kerkhofs et al. (1999) estimate a 
competing risk model for the transition from work to early retirement, disability and 
unemployment for the years 1993-1995. The attractiveness of the different schemes is 
characterised by (i) the replacement rate, (ii) an eligibility indicator for the early retirement 
scheme, and (iii) a ‗waiting time indicator‘ for the scheme. The schemes considered in this 
study are not actuarially adjusted over different retirement ages, implying that the estimated 
coefficients on the replacement rate represent an effect of the implicit tax rate on the labour 
force participation decision. The second and third indicator are likewise related to the lack of 
actuarial adjustment. Retirement before the early retirement eligibility age would mean a 
complete loss of entitlements. The authors find that high replacement rates in the disability 
and unemployment insurance schemes reduce the individual propensity to make use of the   - 11 - 
 
 
early retirement scheme. Second, they find that the early retirement scheme seems to be 
preferred over the two other schemes (after controlling for replacement rates). Yet, health is 
the most important determinant of transitions into disability, whereas financial incentives are 
the most important determinant of transitions into the official early retirement scheme.
8 Using 
the same data set to estimate a structural dynamic model of retirement behaviour, Heyma 
(2004) finds that reforms in the early retirement schemes increase pressure on both disability 
and unemployment. The author concludes that policies aimed at changing attitudes towards 
retirement seem necessary to increase labour participation of the elderly. 
  In an earlier study, Woittiez et al. (1994) showed that early retirement and disability 
are preferred exit routes from the labour market, whereas unemployment insurance is subject 
to a so-called ‗stigma effect‘. Using data for the period 1986-1992, the authors find a clear 
but small substitution effect between the different exit routes. Simulations indicate that a 
reduction in the financial attractiveness of a scheme leads to a higher participation rate, and 
that spill-over effects to other schemes are present but limited in size. Using survey data for 
the 1990s and the early 20th century, Schils (2008) compares labour force exit rates for 
workers aged 50 to 65 in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. The author distinguishes 
between three pathways: early retirement, social insurance ─ including both disability and 
unemployment ─ and ‗inactivity‘ ─ i.e. not receiving any of these benefits. She concludes 
that early retirement and social insurance act as communicating vessels in Germany and in 
the Netherlands, but less so in the UK.  
  The current study does not investigate unemployment as a substitute pathway, but 
nevertheless there is also ample evidence for several countries for substitution between 
unemployment and disability insurance (Benitez-Silva et al., 2010). A substantial empirical 
literature has focussed on the degree of ‗hidden unemployment‘ in the disability scheme in 
the Netherlands. Explicit estimates ─ ranging from 10 to 50% ─ were provided by Aarts and 
de Jong (1992), Westerhout (1996), and Hassink et al. (1997). However, according to recent 
estimates, the many reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s have led to a substantial 
decline in the degree of hidden unemployment in disability enrolment to a point where there 
is almost no substitution left (Koning and van Vuuren, 2007; 2010). It may however still take 
several decades until the stock of disability recipients is freed from hidden unemployment.  
  The concept of substitute pathways seems to apply to many countries, even including 
the US. In the US, the DI enrolment rate for individuals aged 45 to 64 has increased from 
                                                 
8 A similar result for the US was found by Bound et al. (1991).   - 12 - 
 
 
4.5% in 1983 to 6.7% in 2005. In 2005, 12% of the 64 year old Americans were receiving DI 
benefits. A part of this increase is thought to be a direct consequence of the ‗pathways 
concept‘.
9 The 1983 Social Security reform reduced the generosity of public old-age pensions 
in the U.S. by both increasing the full retirement age and increasing the penalty for claiming 
benefits at the early retirement age of 62. This has made the disability pathway to retirement 
relatively more attractive. Duggan et al. (2007) indeed find that disability enrolment has 
significantly increased as a consequence of the reform. Estimates indicate that each $5000 
decline in the present value of old-age pension benefits increased enrolment by 0.4%-points 
for men and 0.8%-points for women. According to the authors, the aggregate disability 
enrolment figure of 45 to 65 year olds has become more than a percentage point lower 
because of the reform.
10 A similar effect was found in France, where pension reform has 
pushed up the use of disability insurance (Behaghel et al., 2010). 
 
4.  Data 
The empirical evidence in this study is based on administrative data from the health care 
sector. Below we discuss the early retirement schemes in the sector and the data. A detailed 
discussion can be found in Euwals, Trevisan and van Vuren (2010). 
 
4.1  Early retirement schemes in the health care sector 
The sector underwent the reforms described in Section 2. The transition to an actuarially fair 
early retirement system started on January 1, 1999. The actuarial unfair scheme was 
gradually abolished and replaced by an actuarially fair scheme, the so-called FLEX scheme. 
The benefit level in the new scheme is based on work history. For almost all workers, the 
benefit level of the new scheme is substantially lower than that of the old scheme. 
Furthermore, early retirees no longer accrue old-age-pension-rights under the new scheme.  
  The sector introduced a transitional scheme to compensate workers who were close to 
eligibility for the old early retirement scheme. This so-called OBU early retirement scheme 
was installed for workers who were born before 1949, and who would have qualified for the 
                                                 
9 Note that the official name of the American DI scheme is Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Autor 
and Duggan (2003) link the increased use of DI to rising replacement rates for low-skilled workers, and Black et 
al. (2002) demonstrate that the recessions in 1991 and 2001 increased pressure on DI. 
10 An earlier study by Mitchell and Phillips (2000) concluded smaller spill-over effects. This study did however 
not exploit the actual changes in Social Security rights over different birth cohorts, and was not able to observe 




11 The OBU-scheme is financially more attractive than the new scheme for almost 
all workers. The replacement rate is higher, and postponement of retirement results in a 
higher future benefit, which was not the case in the old scheme. However, after age 63 no 
actuarial adjustments are made. And during the period of early retirement members continue 
to build up old-age-pension-rights. The OBU-scheme was de facto abolished from January 1, 
2006. Since then, the early retirement facilities are integrated into the old-age-pension 
scheme (Section 2.1). 
 
4.2  Administrative data 
The empirical analysis is based on administrative data from the pension fund of the health 
care sector, PFWZ (formerly PGGM). It is the second largest pension fund in the 
Netherlands, providing pension arrangements to more than 2 million (ex-)employees in the 
health and social work sector. The data cover the period 1999-2006 and contain individual 
information on gender, date of birth, working hours, wages, tenure, and pension and early 
retirement entitlements. In principle, the dataset includes all individuals who contribute to the 
system at present and all individuals who have contributed in the past. The original 
administrative dataset is transformed into a so-called event-history dataset in order to 
facilitate the longitudinal analysis described in the next section. 
  The dataset is administered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and can be merged with 
other types of administrative data. For the analysis in this study, the administrative pension 
fund data is merged with the municipal population register (the so-called GBA - 
Gemeentelijke BasisAdministratie voor persoonsgegevens) and the job registers. The 
administrative municipal data contains individual information on demographic and household 
characteristics. The job register is based on the national employment insurance register and 
on the registers of the tax authorities. The employment register contains individual 
information of all employees in the Netherlands, including working hours, wages, and 
employer information. 
 
4.3  Descriptive statistics 
We restrict the sample to individuals aged 50 to 64. The number of observations increases 
from 150 thousand in 1999 to 330 thousand in 2006. The share of women in the sample is 
four out of five in 2006. Part-time employment is common in the health care sector. The 
                                                 
11 The Dutch acronym OBU stands for ‗OverBrUgginpensioen‘ (‗Bridge pension‘).     - 14 - 
 
 
average hours worked equals two-thirds of a standard full-time job. At first, we divide 
participants into six groups: active (employed in the sector), stand-by-employee, sleeper (not 
employed in the sector), disabled, OBU-prepension and FLEX-prepension (Table 2). The 
number of ‗sleepers‘, i.e. participants in the pension fund who are not building up additional 
pension rights and not yet receiving pension benefits, is large in 2002 for administrative 
reasons. Sleepers include workers who have moved to another firm or sector and unemployed 
workers, and they are informed about the status of their pension rights every five years. 
Unemployed workers may receive regular unemployment benefits, additional unemployment 
benefits for elderly or social assistance. The percentage of individuals making use of the new 
(financially less attractive) FLEX scheme is practically negligible. For this reason the next 
section will ignore the FLEX scheme and focus on the transition (and financially more 
attractive) OBU scheme. 
 
Table 2  Labour market status individuals age 50-64, 1999-2003, 2005-2006 
a
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2005  2006 
               
Observations  154284  179903  179779  258962  250171  245377  326300 
               
Status   %             
1:=Active in sector  75  74  77  64  73  87  70 
2:=Stand-by-employee
b
  4  3  3  3  3  3  2 
3:=Sleeper 
c
  2  9  1  16  3  5  4 
4:=Disabled  11  8  10  10  13  1  11 
5:=OBU-prepension 
d
  7  6  9  7  9  4  12 
6:=FLEX-prepension 
e
  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
  a
 Due to a recording problem for the year 2004 the data for that year will not be used in the analysis.  
b
 Stand-by-employees are employed based on call-up and zero-hours contracts. 
c
 Sleeper are individuals under age 65 who have built up old-age pension rights in the past, but who are currently not working in the sector . 
d
 Early retirees in the transitional (and financially attractive) scheme. 
e
 Early retirees in the new (and financially less attractive) scheme. 
 
Table 3  Next year’s labour market status of active individuals age 50-64, 1999-2002, 2005 
a
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2005 
Next year’s status 
b
           
1:= Active in sector  92.9  90.8  92.3  89.9  91.1 
2:= Stand-by-employee  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3 
3: = Sleeper  2.1  2.9  2.3  3.8  3.3 
4: = Disabled  0.9  1.3  1.3  1.3  0.2 
5: = OBU-prepension  3.9  4.8  3.8  4.6  4.8 
6: = FLEX-prepension  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.3 
  a
 Due to the recording problem for 2004 transitions from 2003 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2005 have to be disregarded. The table reports 
claiming behaviour and disregards the possibility that benefit recipients may be still working in another sector of industry.
 
b
 The status in year t+2 is imputed using pension fund and job register data in case the status in year t+1 is missing. 
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Figure 3: Hazard rate into OBU early retirement by age for those being eligible
 a  
 
a The hazard rate is defined as the probability that an individual will receive an OBU early retirement benefit at age a conditional on being active at 
age a-1. The figure presents the so-called Kaplan-Meier estimator of the hazard rate. For instance, the OBU hazard rate at age 60 is the 
probability that an individual exits the labour market through the OBU early retirement scheme given that he/she was active at age 59. 
Figure 4: Hazard rate into disability by age for those being eligible (left) and              
non-eligible (right) to the attractive early retirement scheme OBU 
a 
 
a See footnote of Figure 3. 
 
  In Table 3 we show ‗flow probabilities‘ of active individuals to the six categories. 
Most workers between the ages of 50 and 65, about 90% of them, are still active in the sector 
in the next year. The number of individuals starting to receive a disability pension has 
decreased substantially in 2005. This is in line with the reforms in the disability scheme. The 
number of individuals who start receiving the financially attractive OBU pension varies 
between 3.8 and 4.8% per year. The number of individuals who start receiving the new and 
financially less attractive FLEX pension increases slowly over time. 
  The option of retiring at age 60 seems attractive for many workers. About 70% of 
employees eligible for the financially attractive OBU pension at some age retire at the age of 
60, and this has hardly changed over time (Figure 3). Postponing retirement is financially 
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increases in case of postponement.
 From 2001 onwards it is allowed to receive the OBU 
pension and to be still working. Total income must however remain below 100% of the last 
earned income in order to receive the favourable fiscal treatment of the early retirement 
benefit. The first age at which workers retire is 58. Workers who have access to the OBU 
pension at age 60 are allowed to retire part-time from age 58 with a benefit equalling half of 
the full benefit level. In that case they receive the partial benefit at ages 58-61, and from age 
62 they receive the full benefit. This part-time retirement option seems flexible and may 
therefore be attractive. Yet, the conditional probability to retire at age 58 is small. This seems 
to be at odds with Kantarci and van Soest (2008), who show that many Dutch elderly have a 
stated preference for part-time retirement. A tentative explanation may be that many in the 
sector already work part-time (see Table A.1 of the appendix). 
  Compared to other exit routes, the OBU early retirement benefit is financially 
attractive. So individuals who are eligible for the OBU pension may have a relatively low 
probability to enter the disability insurance (DI) scheme. This is the hypothesis of substitute 
pathways: a preference for labour market exit leads to inflow into a benefit scheme, and 
having no access to one particular exit route will increase the probability of inflow into the 
alternative exit routes. The conditional probabilities of entering DI may suggest some 
substitution between exit routes for some years. For the years 1999 and 2001 the probability 
to enter DI decreased at age 60 for individuals having access to the OBU benefit (left panel of 
Figure 4). This is exactly the age at which inflow into the OBU schemes reaches a maximum, 
see previous figure. For the years 2002 and 2005 this drop in the inflow into DI does not 
occur however. Furthermore, the inflow into DI should differ in level and by age between 
those having and not having access to the OBU benefit in case of the substitute pathways (left 
and right panel of Figure 4). In particular, the inflow into DI should be higher for those who 
are not eligible for the OBU early retirement benefit. The level of inflow differs however 
between years, and a systematic difference is hard to recognise. To deal with the variation 
between the years, the next section will use statistical methods to test the hypotheses. 
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
We model the transition in labour market status of active employees as a discrete variable 
with four possible outcomes: (1) continue working, (2) inflow into disability insurance, (3) 
early retirement with the financially attractive OBU scheme, or (4) ‗other exit routes‘. The 
latter category includes transitions to (unpaid) non-participation, unemployment, and work in 
another firm or sector. For early retirement with the OBU scheme, we aggregate full-time and   - 17 - 
 
 
part-time retirement. We use a Multinomial Logit Model to investigate the labour market 
transitions of active individuals for ages 58, 59, 60 and 61 separately:  
 





it j j it t j
i t i t
it j j it t j
j
X d W
y j y working
X d W
,  
where yi,t+1 is the observed outcome for individual i at time t+1, and the vector Xit contains 
explanatory individual variables at time t, the dummy variable dit indicates whether the 
individual is eligible for the OBU early retirement scheme at time t, while vector Wt contains 
dummies representing the year. The possible statuses at time t+1 are (1) ‗working‘, (2) 
‗disability‘, and (3) ‗OBU early retirement‘; the reference category is (4) ‗other exit routes‘. 
The vectors of coefficients βj and δj and the coefficient γj measure effects in comparison to 
effects on the probability to stop working in the health care sector through the ‗other exit 
routes‘-category. The unknown parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. Results are 
presented in terms of ‗marginal effects‘ on all categories (including ‗else‘), that is, the change 
in the probability of being in category j as a result of a change in the explanatory variables. 
  The general claim in this study is that the reforms in DI and early retirement schemes, 
as discussed in Section 3, have led to a different functioning of the labour market. We expect 
that the policy reforms influence labour force participation and labour market exits in the 
health care sector. Our first hypothesis is that the inflow into early retirement and disability 
has decreased at the individual level, and so the probability to remain employed has 
increased. The parameter estimates for δj should show a significant decrease over the years 
for early retirement and disability, and a significant increase for continuing working. Our 
second hypothesis is that the reforms have lowered substitution between exit routes. In 
particular, disability insurance is not used anymore as a route for early retirement and the 
parameter estimate for γj, representing the eligibility to the OBU scheme, should be 
insignificant for disability. In case the pathways are not relevant anymore, which may be the 
case because of the reforms, not being eligible for the OBU scheme should in particular 
increase the probability to remain working. 
  The estimation results appear to confirm the first hypothesis as labour force 
participation has indeed increased over time. Table 4 summarizes some typical regression 
results for labour market transitions at age 60, given that they are active in the previous 
period. The pattern of the year dummies shows that the probability of OBU early retirement   - 18 - 
 
 
has decreased over time, whereas labour market participation has increased. The probability 
to stay working in the same job has increased by 17%-points between 2000 and 2005. Similar 
results are found for other ages; see Table A.2 of the appendix. At age 60, the inflow in 
disability has not significantly decreased over time, but for other ages the probability was 
significantly lower for 2005, see again Table A.2. 
  The estimation results also appear to confirm the second hypothesis. Eligibility for the 
OBU early retirement scheme does not affect the probability to enter DI. In case of substitute 
pathways, a non-eligible individual could opt for DI. But the results do not confirm such a 
substitution effect. The marginal effects in Table A.2 show that nearly all individuals who are 
not yet eligible continue working. Earlier studies for the Netherlands have found evidence for 
a substitution effect (see section 3). Therefore our results support the hypothesis that the 
reforms have halted substitution, and DI is not used for early retirement anymore. 
  Besides the hypotheses we have tested, the results show some additional insights. 
First, eligibility to OBU early retirement does not affect the transition probabilities at age 58. 
So part-time early retirement with does not seem to be that attractive for workers in the 
sector. At age 59, the dummies for eligibility are statistically significant for continuing 
working and inflow into the OBU scheme, but the size of the effect is small. At ages 60 and 
61 the marginal effect of eligibility is large. Being eligible for the OBU benefit increases the 
probability to claim the benefit by more than 60%-points. This is likely related to the implicit 
taxes on continued work (see previous section). Second, individual characteristics clearly 
matter for exit behaviour. Women are less likely to continue working and are more likely to 
retire with the OBU scheme. Individuals with a partner are also less likely to continue 
working, while individuals with children are more likely to continue working. 
 
Table 5  Marginal effects for employees at age 60 over the period 1999-2002&2005 
a 
Outcome variable   still working    Inflow-DI    Inflow-OBU   
             
Eligible at age 60
 b
  -0.618*  (0.006)  0.001  (0.001)  0.636*  (0.005) 
2000  -0.093*  (0.011)  0.012*  (0.004)  0.094*  (0.011) 
2001  0.021  (0.011)  0.008*  (0.003)  0.002  (0.011) 
2002  0.039*  (0.011)  0.009*  (0.003)  -0.027*  (0.009) 
2005  0.081*  (0.010)  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.030*  (0.010) 
woman  -0.087*  (0.008)  0.002*  (0.001)  0.088*  (0.009) 
partner  -0.122*  (0.007)  -0.001  (0.001)  0.113*  (0.007) 
children  0.078*  (0.008)  0.001  (0.001)  -0.074*  (0.008) 
  a
 Standard errors are given between parentheses. Full estimation results can be found in Table A.2 of the appendix. 
b
 Eligible to the financially attractive OBU early retirement scheme. The hypothesis of a decreasing substitution between exit routes over 




6.  Conclusion 
The institutions facilitating early retirement in the Netherlands have been reshaped during the 
past two decades. Mandatory occupational early retirement schemes were abandoned, and 
partially integrated into the old-age pension system. Early retirement benefits through the 
pension system are actuarially fair, and the replacement rate is now lower. The Disability 
Insurance (DI) scheme was reformed almost simultaneously with the early retirement 
schemes. Several measures were taken to prevent inflow into DI, including financial 
incentives for both employers and employees and more stringent reintegration obligations in 
case of sickness. The objective of this study is to assess whether the policies have been 
successful in decreasing labour market exit through both alternative exit routes. 
  The empirical literature shows that there is ample evidence for substitute pathways 
into early retirement in the past in the Netherlands as well as in several other countries. In 
other words, a general preference for early retirement existed and individual workers had a 
‗choice‘ between several exit routes, including ‗official‘ early retirement, disability and 
unemployment. The policy reforms of the last decades may, however, have reduced such 
substitution between alternative exit routes. In this study, we assess whether administrative 
data in the health care sector are consistent with the hypothesis that the participation rate of 
elderly has increased and that DI is no longer used as an alternative exit route. Our empirical 
analysis provides support for the hypothesis that employment rates of older individuals have 
increased. Moreover, the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that DI is no 
longer used as an alternative early exit route. The reforms seem to have prevented 
substitution from early retirement schemes towards the disability scheme. 
  Overall policies established in the Netherlands to prevent early labour market exit 
have been successful. Participation incentives have improved and the costs of providing early 
exit routes have been reduced. This does however not necessarily prove that the Dutch 
policies are optimal in the sense that well-being has increased. Workers are likely to be risk 
averse, and they have a preference for reasonable labour market exit options in case of a 
substantial loss in skills, for example due to health or technology shocks. The development of 
tools for welfare analysis, see Cremer et al. (2004, 2008) and Zaidi and Whitehouse (2009), 
is therefore necessary to assess the effectiveness of policy.   
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Appendix: Sample means and estimation results 
Table A.1: Sample means of explanatory variables 
Period: 1999-2002; 2005  still working    inflow-DI 
                   
variable \ age  58  59  60  61    58  59  60  61 
Eligible at age 60  83.3  82.5  59.3  34.1    89.3  84.8  82.4  50.5 
Eligible at age 61  1.6  2.0  5.7  12.0    1.8  2.7  4.2  13.9 
Eligible at age 62  1.4  1.2  4.2  8.6    2.2  2.5  1.4  8.9 
Eligible at age 63  1.5  1.3  2.5  5.9    2.0  3.2  2.3  5.0 
Eligible at age 64  1.3  1.4  2.8  3.9    0.2  2.0  1.4  6.9 
1999  14.2  13.0  13.8  13.0    14.9  14.0  7.5  10.9 
2000  16.8  15.2  11.7  15.4    26.6  27.0  27.8  28.7 
2001  17.9  17.4  16.3  15.9    25.8  24.8  23.1  18.8 
2002  19.7  20.9  19.9  19.1    28.2  30.0  31.0  33.7 
2005  31.4  33.5  38.3  36.6    4.5  4.2  10.6  7.9 
woman  77.5  76.8  72.9  70.4    84.6  89.2  83.3  90.1 
immigrant  12.4  12.2  14.4  16.1    11.4  10.8  12.5  13.4 
partner  76.6  75.9  70.0  65.8    70.2  75.5  74.1  54.5 
Children  25.9  22.6  22.6  21.5    21.9  21.6  21.8  9.9 
small job (< 40%)  18.4  18.9  22.1  26.3    19.3  23.3  31.9  33.7 
middle job  40.8  40.2  37.2  34.6    46.6  46.7  36.2  35.6 
large job (> 80%)  40.8  40.9  40.7  39.1    34.1  30.0  31.9  30.7 
Number of observations  48305  41814  14286  6545    507  408  216  101 
                   
  inflow-OBU    else 
variable \ age  58  59  60  61    58  59  60  61 
Eligible at age 60  98.7  98.8  98.0  82.9    69.8  69.4  82.5  37.6 
Eligible at age 61  0.1  0.4  0.9  13.9    2.9  3.1  2.0  9.9 
Eligible at age 62  0.1  0.2  0.2  2.2    2.8  2.4  1.1  7.1 
Eligible at age 63  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1    3.5  1.7  1.1  3.9 
Eligible at age 64  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.1    2.1  2.4  1.0  3.3 
1999  20.1  17.7  14.8  5.6    19.2  15.7  6.8  3.1 
2000  22.0  20.3  18.8  27.7    20.7  26.1  5.7  9.3 
2001  16.1  9.8  18.6  15.8    19.4  17.7  3.9  10.4 
2002  14.6  13.9  12.0  27.3    35.6  34.7  77.6  57.0 
2005  27.2  38.3  35.8  23.6    5.1  5.8  6.0  20.2 
woman  73.1  74.1  79.0  77.5    74.9  73.6  77.4  66.4 
immigrant  8.9  10.6  11.1  14.1    13.0  14.1  11.0  15.3 
partner  74.8  78.5  79.5  74.0    79.6  77.0  79.4  70.7 
Children  22.0  18.5  16.3  18.9    22.4  19.2  17.7  19.4 
small job (< 40%)  9.7  15.4  18.4  17.1    28.5  29.6  24.2  25.6 
middle job   34.9  37.2  41.6  41.7    39.1  36.3  45.3  37.1 
large job (> 80%)  55.4  47.4  40.0  41.2    32.4  34.1  30.5  37.3 
Number of observations  1346  2245  20756  3373    1405  1309  3444  777 
  a
 Small jobs are jobs with a part time factor smaller than 40%, middle jobs are jobs with a part time factor between 40 and 80%, large jobs are jobs 
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Table A.2: Marginal effects on probabilities of  labour market transitions (1999-2002, 2005) 
a 
still working  58     59     60     61   
                 
Eligible at age 60  -0.007  (0.003)  -0.033  (0.004)  -0.618  (0.006)  -0.589  (0.016) 
Eligible at age 61  -0.003  (0.019)  -0.122  (0.059)  -0.262  (0.017)  -0.660  (0.023) 
Eligible at age 62  0.004  (0.015)  -0.127  (0.072)  -0.008  (0.045)  -0.438  (0.044) 
Eligible at age 63  -0.009  (0.020)  -0.102  (0.068)  -0.005  (0.058)  0.102  (0.049) 
Eligible at age 64  -0.008  (0.024)  0.004  (0.035)  -0.041  (0.053)  -0.019  (0.073) 
2000  0.000  (0.002)  -0.009  (0.003)  -0.093  (0.011)  -0.240  (0.024) 
2001  0.008  (0.002)  0.023  (0.003)  0.021  (0.011)  -0.167  (0.025) 
2002  0.002  (0.002)  0.011  (0.003)  0.039  (0.011)  -0.330  (0.028) 
2005  0.047  (0.002)  0.042  (0.003)  0.081  (0.010)  -0.039  (0.021) 
woman  0.004  (0.002)  0.005  (0.003)  -0.087  (0.008)  -0.064  (0.011) 
immigrant  0.004  (0.002)  0.000  (0.003)  0.047  (0.009)  0.011  (0.012) 
partner  0.001  (0.002)  -0.004  (0.002)  -0.122  (0.007)  -0.070  (0.009) 
Children  0.008  (0.002)  0.011  (0.002)  0.078  (0.008)  0.019  (0.010) 
small job (part time factor < 40%) 0.001  (0.002)  -0.007  (0.003)  0.021  (0.008)  0.055  (0.011) 
large job (part time factor > 80%)  -0.001  (0.002)  -0.001  (0.002)  0.008  (0.008)  0.019  (0.011) 
                 
inflow-DI  58     59     60     61   
Eligible at age 60  0.004  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.001  (0.001)  0.001  (0.002) 
Eligible at age 61  0.003  (0.004)  0.004  (0.004)  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.005  (0.002) 
Eligible at age 62  0.007  (0.005)  0.006  (0.005)  -0.001  (0.003)  -0.001  (0.003) 
Eligible at age 63  0.005  (0.004)  0.010  (0.005)  0.004  (0.005)  0.007  (0.008) 
Eligible at age 64  -0.005  (0.001)  0.004  (0.004)  -0.001  (0.003)  0.013  (0.009) 
2000  0.003  (0.001)  0.003  (0.001)  0.012  (0.004)  0.004  (0.004) 
2001  0.002  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.008  (0.003)  0.001  (0.003) 
2002  0.002  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.009  (0.003)  0.001  (0.003) 
2005  -0.010  (0.001)  -0.009  (0.001)  -0.002  (0.002)  -0.010  (0.003) 
woman  0.002  (0.001)  0.004  (0.001)  0.002  (0.001)  0.007  (0.002) 
immigrant  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.002) 
partner  -0.003  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.001)  -0.004  (0.002) 
Children  -0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.001  (0.001)  -0.005  (0.002) 
small job (part time factor < 40%) -0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.003  (0.001)  0.003  (0.002) 
large job (part time factor > 80%)  -0.002  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001)  0.000  (0.002) 
                 
inflow-OBU  58     59     60     61   
Eligible at age 60  0.027  (0.002)  0.057  (0.002)  0.636  (0.005)  0.642  (0.017) 
Eligible at age 61  0.007  (0.019)  0.126  (0.060)  0.303  (0.018)  0.730  (0.025) 
Eligible at age 62  -0.004  (0.015)  0.130  (0.074)  0.036  (0.049)  0.481  (0.048) 
Eligible at age 63  0.008  (0.020)  0.104  (0.069)  0.030  (0.062)  -0.095  (0.051) 
Eligible at age 64  0.020  (0.024)  0.001  (0.035)  0.078  (0.055)  0.037  (0.078) 
2000  -0.002  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.002)  0.094  (0.011)  0.190  (0.022) 
2001  -0.007  (0.001)  -0.022  (0.002)  0.002  (0.011)  0.095  (0.020) 
2002  -0.010  (0.001)  -0.019  (0.002)  -0.027  (0.009)  0.065  (0.018) 
2005  -0.007  (0.001)  -0.003  (0.002)  -0.030  (0.010)  -0.014  (0.014) 
woman  0.001  (0.001)  -0.002  (0.002)  0.088  (0.009)  0.079  (0.008) 
immigrant  -0.005  (0.001)  -0.003  (0.002)  -0.045  (0.009)  -0.008  (0.009) 
partner  -0.001  (0.001)  0.003  (0.002)  0.113  (0.007)  0.067  (0.007) 
Children  -0.003  (0.001)  -0.007  (0.002)  -0.074  (0.008)  -0.007  (0.008) 
small job (part time factor < 40%) -0.007  (0.001)  -0.001  (0.002)  -0.036  (0.009)  -0.056  (0.008) 
large job (part time factor > 80%)  0.009  (0.001)  0.007  (0.002)  0.003  (0.008)  -0.005  (0.009) 
                   - 25 - 
 
 
else  58     59     60     61   
Eligible at age 60  -0.024  (0.003)  -0.026  (0.003)  -0.019  (0.003)  -0.055  (0.005) 
Eligible at age 61  -0.007  (0.002)  -0.009  (0.002)  -0.040  (0.003)  -0.065  (0.004) 
Eligible at age 62  -0.006  (0.002)  -0.009  (0.002)  -0.027  (0.005)  -0.043  (0.007) 
Eligible at age 63  -0.004  (0.002)  -0.012  (0.002)  -0.029  (0.005)  -0.014  (0.012) 
Eligible at age 64  -0.007  (0.002)  -0.009  (0.002)  -0.036  (0.004)  -0.031  (0.010) 
2000  -0.001  (0.001)  0.007  (0.002)  -0.013  (0.004)  0.046  (0.022) 
2001  -0.004  (0.001)  -0.003  (0.002)  -0.031  (0.003)  0.071  (0.025) 
2002  0.005  (0.002)  0.007  (0.002)  0.224  (0.011)  0.263  (0.035) 
2005  -0.030  (0.001)  -0.030  (0.002)  -0.049  (0.004)  0.063  (0.020) 
woman  -0.007  (0.002)  -0.007  (0.002)  0.009  (0.002)  -0.022  (0.007) 
immigrant  0.001  (0.002)  0.004  (0.002)  -0.002  (0.003)  -0.003  (0.007) 
partner  0.003  (0.001)  0.001  (0.001)  0.009  (0.002)  0.006  (0.006) 
Children  -0.004  (0.001)  -0.005  (0.001)  -0.005  (0.002)  -0.007  (0.006) 
small job (part time factor < 40%) 0.007  (0.002)  0.009  (0.002)  0.012  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.007) 
large job (part time factor > 80%)  -0.006  (0.001)  -0.005  (0.001)  -0.011  (0.003)  -0.015  (0.007) 
  a
 Standard errors are given between parentheses.  
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